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Abstract
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level
and their capital structure, trading oﬀ the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly
default. The costs of bankruptcy are endogenously determined, as bankrupt firms are forced
to liquidate their assets, resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid. When the corporate
income tax rate is positive, firms have a unique optimal capital structure. In equilibrium
firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire-sale prices.
The equilibrium not only features underinvestment but is also constrained ineﬃcient. In
particular there is too little debt and too little default.
JEL Nos: D5, D6, G32, G33
Keywords: Debt, equity, capital structure, default, market liquidity, constrained ineﬃ-
ciency, incomplete markets
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe have
focused attention on the macroeconomic consequences of debt financing. In this paper, we
turn our attention to the use of debt finance in the corporate sector and study the general
equilibrium eﬀects of debt finance on investment and growth. We show that, when markets
are incomplete and firms use debt and equity to finance investment, there is underinvestment
and debt finance is too low in equilibrium.
At the heart of our analysis is the determination of the firm’s capital structure. In the
classical model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure is indeterminate. To ob-
tain a determinate capital structure, subsequent authors appealed to market frictions, such
as distortionary taxes, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs.1 We follow this tradition and
examine an environment where the optimal capital structure balances the tax advantages of
debt against the risk of bankruptcy. More precisely, debt has an advantage over equity be-
cause interest payments are deductible from corporate income, while dividends and retained
earnings are not. At the same time, the use of debt generates the risk of bankruptcy which
the firm perceives as costly because it forces the firm to sell its assets at fire-sale prices. The
firm balances these costs and benefits of debt and equity in choosing its capital structure.
We show that these costs and benefits support an interior optimum of the firm’s capital
structure decision.
We consider an infinite-horizon economy, where firms choose their production and invest-
1See, for example, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1981), Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Brennan and
Schwartz (1978), Dammon and Green (1987), Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Kim (1982), Leland and
Toft (1996), Miller (1977), and Titman (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988).
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ment in long lived capital goods and are subject to productivity shocks. We focus primarily
on firms’ decisions and abstract from distributional issues by assuming there is a representa-
tive consumer. Firms finance the purchase of capital by issuing debt and equity. We assume
that markets are incomplete in two respects. First, there are no markets for contingent claims
allowing firms to insure against the risk of bankruptcy. Second, when a firm is bankrupt
- that is, fails to pay its debtors or to renegotiate its debt - the liquidation of its assets is
subject to a finance constraint that causes assets to be sold at fire sale prices, i.e., at less
than their fundamental value.
In our model, both the corporate income tax and the cost of bankruptcy represent a pure
redistribution of resources rather than a real resource cost for the economy. The corporate
income tax revenue is returned to consumers in the form of lump sum transfers. Similarly,
the fire sale of assets constitutes a transfer of value to the shareholders of the firms that buy
the assets of bankrupt firms, rather than a deadweight cost. Since there is a representative
consumer, this “redistribution” has no eﬀect on welfare. Nonetheless, a rational, value-
maximizing manager of a competitive firm will perceive the tax as a cost of using equity
finance and the risk of a fire sale in bankruptcy as a cost of using debt. These private costs
determine the firm’s financing decisions, act like a tax on capital, and distort the firm’s
investment decision.
As a baseline, consider the case where the corporate income tax rate is zero. In that case,
the competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient and the firms’ capital structure is
indeterminate.2 In other words, with a zero corporate income tax rate, the finance constraint
2To be precise, for each individual firm any combination of debt and equity is optimal. There is however
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never binds and bankruptcy does not result in fire sales. By contrast, when the corporate
income tax rate is positive, competitive equilibria have quite diﬀerent properties. They are
not just Pareto ineﬃcient, exhibiting underinvestment; they are also constrained ineﬃcient.
Also, the optimal capital structure of firms is uniquely determined in equilibrium, each firm
uses positive amounts of risky debt and equity as sources of finance and faces a positive
probability of bankruptcy and fire sales. So many features of the equilibrium change when
the corporate tax rate becomes positive because the tax interacts with the incompleteness
of markets and the finance constraint to endogenously generate private costs of bankruptcy.
The intuition for the second property is simple. If the probability of bankruptcy were
zero or if bankrupt firms could be liquidated with no loss of value, then all firms would use
100% debt finance to avoid the corporate income tax. But, in equilibrium, we will show
that 100% debt finance is inconsistent with a zero probability of bankruptcy or the absence
of fire sales, and is not an optimal decision for firms. A similar argument shows that some
debt has to be used in equilibrium. If firms used 100% equity finance, there would be no
bankruptcy. Then a single firm could issue a small amount of debt and benefit from the tax
hedge, without causing a fire sale. Uniqueness of the optimal capital structure follows from
the fact that a rational manager equates the perceived marginal costs of debt and equity
financing in equilibrium and we show that, under reasonable conditions, the marginal costs
are increasing.3
a constraint on the aggregate amount of debt in the economy, which has to be small enough that fire sales
do not occur.
3We don’t wish to claim too much for this result, of course. The optimal capital structure is unique only
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The constrained ineﬃciency of the equilibrium is the result of a pecuniary externality.
The tax on equity reduces the return on capital and causes underinvestment in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, each firm sets its capital structure so that the benefit of a marginal increase
in its debt level, in terms of lower tax paid by the firm, just oﬀsets the increase in private
bankruptcy costs.4 However, if all firms were to increase their use of debt, the liquidation
price of defaulting firms would drop, and hence the profits of any firm buying these assets
when solvent increase. This eﬀect oﬀsets the increase in private costs when the firm is
bankrupt. As a result, an increase in the debt level of all firms would lower the tax paid and
increase the return on capital and hence also investment and welfare. The fact that each
firm is a price taker leads it to overestimate the costs of debt financing, whereas the planner
takes into account the change in prices when all firms increase the use of debt. This is the
source of the pecuniary externality. Note that this externality arises even in the presence of a
representative consumer. Consumers collectively own all the assets, tax revenues are returned
to consumers, and firms end up holding the same assets after liquidation. Nonetheless, we
find that individual firms’ decisions are distorted and this imposes a welfare cost on the
economy.
We should point out that, as a result of this externality, in the environment considered
within a given (symmetric) equilibrium. In general, the capital structure depends on the equilibrium, which
in turn depends on the model parameters, including policy parameters such as the tax rate. But note that
the Modigliani-Miller theorem also holds for a given equilibrium of a given model.
4The cost of increasing the firm’s debt level has two components. First, the probability of going bankrupt
and having to liquidate assets in a fire sale increases. Second, the probability of making capital gains when
solvent by buying assets of other firms in a fire sale is reduced.
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there is too little bankruptcy risk and too little debt financing in equilibrium. This appears
to contradict the common intuition that firms have an incentive to use too much debt. Our
analysis shows the importance of a careful evaluation of the costs of firms’ default and of the
reallocation of assets among them which takes place in this event, illustrating a novel eﬀect
of fire sales. The actual costs of default — and hence of debt relative to equity financing
— may prove to be lower than the costs perceived by firms, as firms also benefit from this
reallocation and the opportunity to acquire assets at low prices and these prices are lower
when the probability of default is higher. This misperception induces firms to rely too little
on debt compared to other sources of funding for which the risk of default is lower. We
believe this eﬀect is particularly relevant in markets where the firms purchasing assets at
fire-sale prices are the same firms running the risk of default.
1 Related literature
The classical literature on the firm’s investment decision excludes external finance constraints
and bankruptcy costs and uses adjustment costs to explain the reliance of investment on To-
bin’s  (see Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent, 2008, for a contemporary example). The new wave
literature on investment, exemplified by Sundaresan, Wang and Yang (2014) and Bolton,
Chen and Wang (2011), incorporates financing frictions of various types, such as a cost of
external funds, liquidity constraints and costs of liquidating the firm’s assets. Hackbarth
and Mauer (2012) then also allow for multiple debt issues with possibly diﬀerent seniority.
These papers study the investment and financing decisions of an individual firm in partial
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equilibrium.
A few papers consider instead, like our work, dynamic general equilibrium models with
several heterogeneous firms making optimal investment and financing decisions. Gomes and
Schmid (2010) and Miao and Wang (2010) study an environment fairly close to ours: they
also examine a representative agent economy where firms’ investment can be financed with
debt or equity, subject to a similar structure of costs. The liquidation cost, in the event
of default is exogenous in their set-up, whereas it is endogenously determined in ours by
the equilibrium price of liquidated assets. Also, they focus on the numerical analysis of an
equilibrium for a specification of the model aimed to match the persistence and volatility
of output growth, as well as credit spreads, while we provide a qualitative characterization
of equilibria and their welfare properties. The links between firms’ credit risk and their
leverage and investment decisions across the business cycle are examined by Kuehn and
Schmid (2011) in a partial equilibrium model with similar costs of financing.
The macroeconomic literature has emphasized the role of external finance constraints in
the business cycle. The financial accelerator model (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke,
Gilchrist and Gertler, 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) shows that shocks to firm equity
or the value of collateral can restrict borrowing and amplify business cycle fluctuations.
Our focus is rather diﬀerent: we consider an environment where financial frictions take the
form of private costs of debt or equity financing rather than borrowing constraints. We
also emphasize the factors that determine the firm’s choice of capital structure and the
implications for welfare and regulatory interventions.
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Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) have shown that capital reallocation is procyclical, whereas
default is counter-cyclical. This might suggest that reallocation of capital associated with
fire sales might be a relatively small part of capital reallocation as a whole. Since the data in
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) does not break out the amount of reallocation that results from
fire sales, we cannot be sure how large that component is. This is a question that requires
further research.5
Pecuniary externalities play a key role in our welfare analysis. It has been well known
since the mid-eighties that pecuniary externalities have an impact on welfare in the presence
of market incompleteness, information asymmetries, or other frictions (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1986; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). It is interesting
to contrast our constrained ineﬃciency result to the ones obtained by Lorenzoni (2008) (see
also Bianchi, 2011, Korinek, 2012, Gersbach and Rochet, 2012) in a financial accelerator
model of the kind discussed in the previous paragraph, where firms’ borrowing is constrained
by the future value of their assets. These authors show that equilibria may display excessive
borrowing, since a reduction in borrowing and investment allows to reduce the misallocation
costs of selling some of the firms’ assets in order to absorb negative shocks. In contrast we
show the ineﬃciency of the firms’ capital structure decisions in equilibrium in an environment
where firms are not constrained by the level of their collateral, but face some (endogenous)
costs of using alternative sources of funding. We find that an increase in the use of debt
5The data that Eisenfeldt and Rampini use to measure capital reallocation is deflated using the CPI. Since
capital may vary over the cycle and would be expected to be lower in distress sales than in non-distressed
sales, the figures are likely to understate capital reallocation resulting from fire sales.
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relative to equity allows firms to lower their cost of funds, since the liquidation of the assets
of bankrupt firms at fire-sale prices constitutes not only a cost for a firm when bankrupt but
also a benefit for the same firm when solvent which firms fail to properly internalize.
The interaction between illiquidity and incompleteness of asset markets is also studied
in the literature on banking and financial crises. For models of fire sales and their impact
on bank portfolios, see Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b). Wagner (2011) studies the impact
of fire sales on agents’ portfolio choices: the possibility of forced liquidation by leveraged
investors leads them to choose heterogeneous portfolios, thus sacrificing some of the benefits
of diversification.
The debt renegotiation process in our model was previously used by Gale and Gottardi
(2011) in a static model in which, by assumption, all investment was 100% debt financed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the primitives of
the model and characterize the first-best allocation. In Section 3 we describe the structure
of markets available specifying financial frictions and examine the decision problems of firms
and consumers. Section 4 defines competitive equilibria and establishes various fundamen-
tal properties. Section 5 shows that equilibria are ineﬃcient and exhibit underinvestment.
Moreover, it shows that they are also constrained ineﬃcient and the capital structure cho-
sen by firms exhibit too little debt. The concluding section discusses the robustness of the
results and extensions of the model. All proofs are collected in the appendix to this paper.
Extensions and additional results are contained in Appendix B, available online.
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2 The Economy
We consider an infinite-horizon production economy. Time is described by a countable
sequence of dates,  = 0 1 . At each date there are two goods, a perishable consumption
good and a durable capital good.
2.1 Consumers
There is a unit mass of identical, infinitely-lived consumers. The consumption stream of the
representative consumer is denoted by c = (0 1 ) ≥ 0, where  is the amount of the
consumption good consumed at date . For any c ≥ 0, the representative consumer’s utility
is denoted by  (c) and given by
 (c) =
∞X
=0
() (1)
where 0    1 and  : R+ → R has the usual properties: it is 2 and such that 0 ()  0
and 00 ()  0 for any  ≥ 0.
2.2 Production
There are two production sectors in the economy. In one, capital is produced using the
consumption good as an input. In the other, the consumption good is produced using the
capital good as an input.
Capital goods sector There is a unit mass of firms operating the technology for producing
capital. If  ≥ 0 is the amount of the consumption good used as an input at date , the
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output is  () ≥ 0 units of capital at the end of the period, where  (·) is a 2 function
satisfying 0 ()  0 and 00 ()  0, for any  ≥ 0, as well as the Inada conditions,
lim→0 0 () =∞ and lim→∞ 0 () = 0.
Consumption goods sector The technology for producing the consumption good uses
capital as an input and exhibits constant returns to scale. Production in this sector is
undertaken by a continuum of firms subject to independent stochastic depreciation rates.
Each unit of capital good used as an input by firm  at an arbitrary date  produces
(instantaneously)   0 units of output and becomes  units after production takes place.
The random variables  are assumed to be i.i.d. across firms as well as over time with
mean ¯, support ∈ [0 1] and a continuous p.d.f. () We denote the c.d.f. by  () and
the only other condition we impose on the distribution of  is that the hazard rate ()
1− () is
increasing.
2.3 Feasible allocations
At date 0, there is an initial stock of capital goods ¯0  0. To characterize the allocations
attainable in this economy the heterogeneity among firms and the idiosyncratic depreciation
shocks can be ignored since production can be diversified across the large number of firms.
By the law of large numbers convention, there is no aggregate uncertainty and the aggregate
depreciation rate is constant, with a fraction ¯ of the capital stock remaining each period
after depreciation. Thus a total amount of  ≥ 0 units of capital goods at date  produces
 units of consumption and leaves, after depreciation, ¯ units of capital goods to be used
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next period.
A (symmetric) allocation is thus given by a sequence {  }∞=0 that specifies the
consumption , capital , and investment  at each date . The allocation {  }∞=0 is
feasible if, for every date  = 0 1 , it satisfies non-negativity,
(  ) ≥ 0 (2)
attainability for the consumption good,
 +  ≤  (3)
and the law of motion for capital,
+1 = ¯ +  ()  (4)
together with the initial condition 0 = ¯0.
It follows from the assumptions regarding the technology for producing the capital good
that there exists a unique level of the capital stock, 0  ˆ ∞, satisfying the condition

³
ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ.
When the capital stock at the beginning of a period is equal to ˆ, if all the current output
of the consumption good is used for investment the amount of capital available at the end of
the period remains constant, equal to ˆ. It is then straightforward to show that ˆ constitutes
an upper bound on the permanently feasible levels of the stock of capital.
Proposition 1 At any feasible allocation {  }∞=0, we have lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ.
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As a corollary, ˆ is an upper bound on the levels of consumption and investment that can
be maintained indefinitely:
lim sup
→∞
 ≤ ˆ lim sup→∞  ≤ ˆ
2.4 Eﬃcient allocations
A first-best, socially optimal allocation maximizes the utility of the representative consumer
within the set of feasible allocations. More precisely, it is a sequence {  }∞=0 that solves
the problem of maximizing the representative consumer’s utility (1) subject to the feasibility
constraints (2), (3), and (4).
To characterize the properties of the first best, consider the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for an interior solution
¡     ¢ À 0  = 0 1  of this problem. For
some non-negative multipliers {( )}∞=0, the allocation
©¡     ¢ª∞=0 must satisfy
the conditions
0 ¡ ¢ = 
+1+ +1¯ = 
and
0
¡ ¢ = 
for every , together with the feasibility conditions (2-4) and the initial condition 0 = ¯0.
The boundedness property established above implies that the transversality condition
lim→∞
∞X
=
 () = 0
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is automatically satisfied.
Much of our analysis focuses on steady states, that is on allocations such that
(  ) = (  )
for all . It is interesting to see what the above first-order conditions imply for an optimal
steady state:
Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state, the capital stock is given by
 = 
¡¢
1− ¯  (5)
where ∗ is determined by

1− ¯ =
1
0 ()  (6)
Condition (6) has a natural interpretation in terms of marginal costs and benefits. The
marginal revenue of a unit of capital at the end of period 0 is

1− ¯ = + 
2¯+   + ¯−1+    
because it produces ¯−1 units of the consumption good at each date   0 and the present
value of that consumption is ¯−1. The marginal cost of a unit of capital is 10() units
of consumption at date 0. So the optimality condition (6) requires the equality of marginal
cost and marginal revenue.
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3 An incomplete markets economy
In this section we specify the structure of markets available in this economy and study the
decision problems of individual firms and consumers.
3.1 Firms and Markets
In the capital goods sector, since production is instantaneous and no capital is used, firms
simply maximize current profits in each period.
In the consumption sector, firms use capital, are infinitely lived and choose their in-
vestment level and financing strategy each period in the available markets. Firms are ex
ante identical, but subject to idiosyncratic depreciation shocks each period. Their ex post
heterogeneity cannot be ignored when we study their investment and financing decisions.
In a frictionless environment, where firms have access to a complete set of contingent
markets to borrow against their future income stream and hedge the idiosyncratic depreci-
ation shocks, the first-best allocation can be decentralized, in the usual way, as a perfectly
competitive equilibrium. In what follows, we consider instead an environment with financial
frictions, where there are no markets for contingent claims, firms are financed exclusively
with debt and equity and their output is sold in spot markets. In this environment as we
will see the first best is typically not attainable.
In the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount and value of a firm’s capital in the
subsequent period, debt financing gives rise to the risk of bankruptcy. This may be perceived
by the firm as costly because, in the event of default, the firm is required to liquidate its
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assets by selling them to firms that remain solvent. These firms, though solvent, may be
finance-constrained. When this happens, there will be a fire sale, in which assets are sold
for less than their full economic value.
Equity financing, by contrast, entails no bankruptcy risk. The disadvantage of equity
is that firms must pay a (distortionary) tax on equity’s returns. We assume for simplicity
that the revenue of the tax on equity is used to make an equal lump sum transfer to all
consumers.
Both sources of funding, debt and equity, entail some private costs for firms in the
consumption goods sector. Firms choose their optimal capital structure in each period, that
is, the composition of outstanding debt and equity, by trading oﬀ the relative costs and
benefits.
Given the CRTS property of the technology, the size of individual firms and the mass of
firms active in the consumption goods sector are indeterminate. Moreover, since there will
be bankruptcy of some of the existing firms and we allow for entry of new firms, the mass
of active firms may change over time. To simplify the description of equilibrium, we will
focus our attention on the case where a combination of entry and exit maintains the mass of
firms equal to unity and firms adjust their size so that each of them has the same amount of
capital. Given the inherent indeterminacy of equilibrium in the consumption goods sector,
this assumption entails no essential loss of generality and allows us to describe the evolution
of the economy in terms of a representative firm with capital stock .
At the initial date  = 0, we assume that all capital is owned by firms in the consumption
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goods sector and that each of these firms has been previously financed entirely by equity.
Each consumer has an equal shareholding in each firm in the two sectors.
In what follows we shall focus our attention on the case where all firms’ debt has a
maturity of one period, so that the entire debt is due for repayment one period after it is
issued. Alternatively, we could have assumed that debt has a maturity of  periods. In that
case the repayment due each period would be smaller. However, debt with longer maturity
also creates a moral hazard problem for creditors, because creditors have little power over
a firm as long as it pays in any period the required interest and principal. Hence equity
holders could enrich themselves at the expense of bond holders, paying themselves large
dividends by selling oﬀ capital until the firm is worthless. To address this problem long-term
bond contracts typically contain multiple covenants controlling the behavior of the firm. For
instance, covenants might restrict the firm’s ability to issue new debt, require the firm to
maintain an adequate ratio of earnings to interest payments, the so-called interest coverage
ratio, or to maintain the value of its assets in relation to the value of debt. If any of those
covenants is violated, the firm is technically in default and the repayment of the entire debt
is due immediately, which forces a renegotiation of the debt, similarly to the case of one
period bonds. In Appendix B, we show how the model can be extended to the special case of
perpetual bonds, where covenants give rise to default precisely as it occurs with one-period
bonds.
To analyze the firms’ decision formally we must first describe in more detail the structure
of markets and the timing of the debt renegotiation process leading possibly to default and
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liquidation.
3.2 Renegotiation and default
Each date  is divided into three sub-periods, labeled , , and .
A. In the first sub-period (), the production of the consumption good occurs and the
depreciation shock of each firm , , is realized. Also, the debt liabilities of each
firm are due. The firm has three options: it can repay the debt, renegotiate (“roll
over”) the debt, or default and declare bankruptcy. Renegotiation is modeled by a
game described in the next section. If renegotiation succeeds the firm remains solvent
and may then distribute its earnings to equity holders or retain them to finance new
purchases of capital.
B. In the intermediate sub-period (), the market opens where bankrupt firms can sell
their assets (their capital). A finance constraint applies, so that only agents with
ready cash, either solvent firms who retained earnings in sub-period  or consumers
who received dividends in sub—period , can purchase the assets on sale. Let  denote
the market price of the liquidated capital.
C. In the final sub-period (), the production of capital goods occurs. The profits of the
firms who operate in this sector are distributed to the consumers who own them. In
addition, debt holders of defaulting firms receive the proceeds of the liquidation sales in
sub-period B. The taxes on equity’s returns are due and the lump sum transfers to con-
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sumers are also made in this sub-period. All other markets open, spot markets, where
the consumption and capital goods are traded, at the prices 1 and , respectively, as
well as asset markets, where debt and equity issued by firms (both surviving and newly
formed) to acquire capital are traded. The consumers buy and sell these securities in
order to fund future consumption and rebalance their portfolios. Equilibrium requires
that  ≤ ; if    no firm buys capital at the price  and capital goods are in
excess supply in sub-period , contradicting the equilibrium conditions.
Note that agents face no finance constraint in the markets in sub-period . We can
interpret the fact that this constraint only applies to the markets for liquidated assets in
sub-period  as portraying the haste with which the firms’ assets need to be sold after a
default. It can also be taken as an institutional feature of the bankruptcy process that does
not apply to other markets.
Bankruptcy procedures are source of numerous possible frictions (see Bebchuk, 1988;
Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In the present model, we focus
on one potential source of market failure, the so-called finance constraint, which requires
buyers to pay for their purchases of assets with the funds (cash) available to them, not with
the issue of IOUs6. Hence, the potential buyer may not be able to raise enough finance to
6The finance constraint takes the form of a liquidity constraint similar to the familiar cash-in-advance
constraint used in macroeconomic and monetary models. We prefer the term finance constraint, first, because
there is no money in the model and, second, because we interpret the constraint as merely ruling out the
possibility of borrowing to fund the purchase of asset trades due to the urgency of these transactions rather
than requiring “cash on the barrelhead.”
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purchase the assets at their full economic value. This is the cost of bankruptcy as perceived
by firms in the environment considered and is endogenously determined in equilibrium.7
We believe that our model of capital markets, with a clear distinction between liquidation
markets, represented by sub-period  where only cash is accepted, and normal markets,
represented by sub-period  where firms have complete access to external finance and there
is no finance constraint, is a reasonable approximation of reality. It is generally accepted
that capital markets are not perfect and it is costly and time consuming for firms to obtain
external finance. A firm with suﬃcient time available may find it feasible to raise finance
for new capital goods by issuing debt and/or equity. In contrast, when a distressed firm
sells assets in a fire sale, firms in the same industry don’t have the time to obtain external
finance and have to rely on retained earnings to purchase these assets.8 The distinction
between markets for liquidated assets, where assets have to sold in a hurry, and normal
asset markets is obviously a matter of degree. Here, we have made the distinction sharper
than it is in reality by assuming the market for liquidated capital goods is “cash only,”
while firms in the other market have “free” access to external finance. This makes the model
tractable, without distorting reality too much, but the distinction could be weakened without
substantial qualitative change.
7In the dynamic environment considered, at any  both the resale price  and the full value  are
endogenous. As further discussed in Section 5.2, we could allow for an additional, deadweight cost of
bankruptcy, with no substantial change in the results.
8A model of this process is found in Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
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3.2.1 Sub-period A: The renegotiation game
Consider a firm with  units of capital and an outstanding debt with face value 9 at
the beginning of period . The firm produces  units of the consumption good, learns the
realization of its depreciation shock  and must then choose whether to repay the debt or
try to renegotiate it. The renegotiation process that occurs in sub-period  between the
firm and the creditors who purchased the firm’s bonds at − 1 is represented by a two-stage
game.
S1 The firm makes a “take it or leave it” oﬀer to the bond holders to rollover the debt,
replacing each unit of the maturing debt with face value  with a combination of
equity and debt maturing the following period. The new face value of the debt, +1,
determines the firm’s capital structure since equity is just a claim to the residual value.
S2 The creditors simultaneously accept or reject the firm’s oﬀer.
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for renegotiation to succeed. First, a majority
of the creditors must accept the oﬀer. Second, the rest of the creditors must be paid oﬀ
in full. If either condition is not satisfied, the renegotiation fails and the firm is declared
bankrupt. In that event, all the assets of the firm are frozen, nothing is distributed until
the capital stock has been liquidated (sold in the market). After liquidation, the sale price
of the liquidated assets is distributed to the bond holders in sub-period . Obviously, there
9Here and in what follows, it is convenient to denote by  the face value of the debt issued per unit of
capital acquired.
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is nothing left for the shareholders in this case. Hence default is always involuntary: a firm
acting so as to maximize its market value will always repay or roll over the debt unless it is
unable to do so.
We show next that there is an equilibrium of this renegotiation game where renegotiation
succeeds if and only if
 ≤ (+ )  (7)
that is, if the value of the firm’s equity is negative when its capital is evaluated at its
liquidation price . Note that the condition is independent of .
Consider, with no loss of generality, the case of a firm with one unit of capital, i.e.,  = 1,
and take an individual creditor holding debt with face value . If he rejects the oﬀer and
demands to be repaid immediately, he receives  in sub-period . With this payment, since
as we said  ≤ , we can assume without loss of generality that he purchases  units of
capital in sub-period . Similarly, if the firm manages to roll over its debt it can retain
its cashflow  and purchase  units of capital in sub-period . Then it will have  + 
units of capital at the start of sub-period . Therefore the most that the firm can oﬀer the
creditor is a claim to an amount of capital  +  at the beginning of sub-period , with
market value 
³

 + 
´
. The firm’s oﬀer will be accepted only if the creditor rejecting the
oﬀer ends up with no more capital than by accepting. Hence the firm is only able to make
an oﬀer that is accepted if

 ≤

 + 
which is equivalent to (7).
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If (7) is satisfied, there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game
in which the firm makes an acceptable oﬀer worth  units of capital at the end of the
period to the creditors and all of them accept. To see this, note first that the shareholders
receive a non-negative payoﬀ from rolling over the debt, whereas they get nothing in the
event of default. Second, the creditors will accept the oﬀer of  because they cannot get
a higher payoﬀ by deviating and rejecting it, and they will not accept a lower oﬀer. Thus,
we have the following simple result:
Proposition 3 There exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the renegotiation game in
which the debt is renegotiated if and only if (7) is satisfied.
Proposition 3 leaves open the possibility that renegotiation may fail even if (7) is satisfied.
Indeed it is the case that if every other creditor rejects the oﬀer, it is optimal for a creditor
to reject the oﬀer because a single vote has no eﬀect. In the sequel, we ignore this trivial
coordination failure among lenders and assume that renegotiation succeeds whenever (7) is
satisfied, to explore other, less trivial, sources of ineﬃciency.
3.2.2 Sub-period B: Liquidation
Let  denote the break even value of , implicitly defined by the following equation
 ≡ +  (8)
Thus renegotiation fails and a firm is bankrupt if and only if   . When all firms active
at the beginning of date  have the same size (), the supply of capital to be liquidated by
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bankrupt firms in sub-period  is
Z 
0
 () 
If    a manager operating a solvent firm in the interest of its shareholders will roll
over the entire amount of its debt in sub-period  and retain all its earnings to have them
available to purchase capital at fire sale prices in sub-period  This choice maximizes the
firm’s market value and shareholders can always sell their shares to finance consumption.
On the other hand if  =  solvent firms are indiﬀerent between retaining their earnings
or distributing them as dividends. The maximal amount of resources available to purchase
capital in sub-period  is then given by the total revenue of solvent firms (with  ≥ )

Z 1

 ()  =  (1−  ()) 
Hence market clearing in the liquidation market requires

Z 
0
 ()  ≤  (1−  ())  (9)
with (9) holding with equality if   , in which case all the available resources of solvent
firms must be oﬀered in exchange for liquidated capital.
3.2.3 Sub-period C: Settlement, investment and trades
Capital sector decisions The decision of the firms operating in the capital goods sector,
in sub-period , is simple. At any date , the representative firm chooses  ≥ 0 to maximize
current profits,  ()−. Because of the concavity of the production function, a necessary
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and suﬃcient condition for the investment level  to be optimal is
0 () ≤ 1 (10)
with strict equality if   0. The profits from the capital sector,  = sup≥0 { ()− },
are then paid to consumers in the same sub-period.
Consumption sector decisions In the consumption goods sector, the firms’ decision
is more complicated because the production of consumption goods requires capital, which
generates returns that repay the investment over time. So the firm needs funds, issuing debt
and equity to finance the purchase of capital.
As we explained above, the number and size of firms in this sector are indeterminate
because of constant returns to scale. We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which, at any
date, a unit mass of firms are active and all of them have the same size, given by  units
of capital10 at the end of date . The representative firm chooses its capital structure to
maximize its market value, that is, the value of the outstanding debt and the equity claims
on the firm. This capital structure is summarized by the break even point11 +1. Whenever
the firm’s depreciation shock next period is +1  +1, the firm defaults and its value (again
per unit of capital held at the end of date ) is equal to the value of the firm’s liquidated
10Because a fraction of firms default each period, the surviving firms who acquire their capital may grow
in size in sub-period , but are then indiﬀerent between buying or selling capital at  in sub-period 
Hence we can always consider a situation where the mass of active firms remains unchanged over time, while
their size varies with 
11The level of  determines the face value of the debt as in (8).
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assets, ++1+1. If +1  +1, the firm is solvent and can use its earnings  to purchase
capital at the price +1. Then the pretax value of the firm is +1
³

+1 + +1
´
.
With regard to the corporate tax, the accounting treatment of depreciation in the presence
of fire sales poses some problems in calculating corporate income. For simplicity, we assume
that the tax base is the value of the firm’s equity at the beginning of sub-period , whenever
it is non negative. The tax rate is then denoted by   0. This tax has the same qualitative
properties as the corporate income tax, in the sense that is a tax on capital goods and gives
preferred treatment to interest on debt.12
To calculate the value of equity, we need to subtract from the value of capital owned by
the firm, +1
³

+1 + +1
´
, the value of the (renegotiated) debt, +1
³+1
+1
´
. The tax base
is so
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1
µ+1
+1
¶
 (11)
and the tax payment due at date + 1 in sub-period  is
 max
½
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1
µ+1
+1
¶
 0
¾
=  max
½+1
+1 (+ +1+1 − +1)  0
¾

Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and there is a continuum of firms oﬀering debt
and equity subject to idiosyncratic shocks, diversified debt and equity are risk-free and must
bear the same rate of return. Denoting by  the risk-free interest rate between date  and
12In Appendix B we show formally the equivalence between a proportional tax on corporate earnings
and a proportional tax on the value of equity in a slightly simpler specification of the environment, where
depreciation is non stochastic.
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+ 1, the value of the firm at  is given by the expected value of the firm at date + 1
Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
−  +1+1 (+ +1+1 − +1)
¸

(12)
divided by 1+ . Hence the firm’s problem consists in the choice of its capital structure, as
summarized by +1, so as to maximize the following objective function
1
1 + 
½Z +1
0
(+ +1+1)  +
Z 1
+1
∙
+1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
− +1 (+1 − +1)
¸

¾
(13)
where we used (8) to substitute for +1 in (12). The solution of the firm’s problem has a
fairly simple characterization:
Proposition 4 When13 +1  +1 there is a unique solution  for the firm’s optimal
capital structure, given by +1 = 0 when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0) ≥  and by 0    1 satisfyingµ
1
+1 −
1
+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) = 
when
³
1− +1+1
´
 (0)   .
The value of the firm (per unit of capital) at a solution of (13) is then equal to the market
value of capital, .
The consumption savings decision The representative consumer has an income flow
generated by his initial ownership of shares of firms in the two sectors, equal to the date
13When +1 = +1 the solution is clearly full debt financing, +1 = 1
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0 value of firms with capital 0 in the consumption goods sector plus the payment each
period of the profits  of firms in the capital good sector. In addition, he receives lump sum
transfers  from the government at every date. Since he faces no income risk and can fully
diversify the idiosyncratic income risk of equity and corporate debt, the consumer eﬀectively
trades a riskless asset each period. His choice problem reduces to the maximization of the
discounted stream of utility subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
max
P∞
=0  ()
s.t. 0 +P∞=1  = 0 + 0¯0 + 0 +P∞=1  ( + )  (14)
where  =Q−1=0 11+ is the discount rate between date 0 and date t, given the access to risk
free borrowing and lending each period at the rate .14
Market clearing The market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
 +  =  for all  ≥ 0 (15)
The markets for debt and equity clear, at any , if the amount of households’ savings is equal
to the value of debt and equity issued by firms in that period. We show in the appendix
that the market-clearing condition for the securities markets is automatically satisfied if the
14The (average) value of firms owning the initial endowment of capital 0 equals the value of the output
0 produced with this capital in sub-period  plus the value of the capital left after depreciation in sub-
period , ¯00. Since they are, as we said, financed entirely with equity, this coincides with their equity
value. Also, while producers of capital good operate and hence distribute profits in every period  ≥ 0 the
first equity issue is at the end of date 0 and hence the first tax revenue on equity earnings is at date  = 1
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market-clearing condition for the consumption goods market (15) is satisfied. This is just
an application of Walras’ law.
Finally, the market for capital clears if
+1 = ¯ +  () (16)
4 Equilibrium
We are now ready to state the equations defining a competitive equilibrium in the environ-
ment described.
Definition 5 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of values
©¡∗  ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗+1 ∗  ∗ ¢ª∞=0
satisfying the following conditions:
1. Profit maximization in the capital goods sector. For every date  ≥ 0, ∗
solves (10).
2. Optimal capital structure. For every date  ≥ 0, the capital structure ∗+1 of the
firms in the consumption goods sector satisfies:
µ
1
∗+1 −
1
∗+1
¶¡+ ∗+1∗+1¢  ¡∗+1¢1−  ¡∗+1¢ =  
and the value of firms in this sector satisfies the law of motion
(1 + ∗ ) ∗ =
½Z ∗+1
0
¡+ ∗+1+1¢  +Z 1
∗+1
µ
∗+1
µ 
∗+1 + +1
¶
− ∗+1 (+1 − +1)
¶

)
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3. Optimal consumption. The sequence {∗}∞=0 satisfies the following first-order condi-
tions
0 ¡∗+1¢
0(∗ ) =
1
1 + ∗ 
for every date  ≥ 0, together with the budget constraint
∗0 +
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!
∗ = 0 + ∗0 ¯0 + ∗0(∗0 )− ∗0+
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + ∗
!Ã
∗ ∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗ )  ()  + ∗ (∗ )− ∗
!
4. Liquidation market clearing. For every date   0, ∗ ≤ ∗ and (9) holds.
5. Consumption Goods market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, (15) holds.
6. Capital market clearing. For every date  ≥ 0, the sequence {∗ } satisfies (16) and
∗0 = ¯0.
Condition 1 requires firms in the capital goods sector to maximize profits at every date,
taking the price of capital goods ∗ as given. Condition 2 requires firms in the consumption
goods sector to choose their capital structures optimally. The law of motion for the value
of the firm is simply the Bellman equation associated with the maximization problem in
equation (13). Condition 3 requires that the consumption path solves the consumers’ maxi-
mization problem (14). Conditions 4 — 6 are the market-clearing conditions for the liquidated
capital goods in sub-period  and for consumption goods and capital goods in sub-period
.
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The equilibrium market prices of equity ∗ and debt ∗ (per unit of capital) at any
date  are readily obtained from the other equilibrium variables.15 Note that the debt equity
ratio, given by16
∗
∗ =
R ∗+1
0
¡+ ∗+1¢  + R 1 ∗+1 ³ ∗+1 + ∗+1´ R 1
∗+1 ∗+1( − ∗+1) (1− ) 
 (17)
is always increasing in ∗+1 The denominator of (17) is in fact clearly decreasing in ∗+1.
Since ∗ + ∗ = ∗ and ∗+1 maximizes the firms’ market value ∗ the numerator must then
increase with ∗+1.
Putting together the market-clearing condition (9) for liquidated capital in sub-period 
with the optimality conditions for the firms in the consumption goods sector (Proposition 4),
we see that in equilibrium we must have an interior optimum for the firms’ capital structure:
 ∈ (0 1) and   .17 Thus, default occurs with probability strictly between zero and
one:
0   ()  1
and results in a fire sale. Intuitively, if there were no fire sale ( = ) firms would choose
100% debt financing, but this implies default with probability one, which is inconsistent with
market clearing. Similarly, 100% equity financing for all firms implies that there is no default
15As explained above, the returns on diversified equity and debt are deterministic. Thus, ∗ and ∗ must
be such that the one-period expected returns on debt and equity are equal to the risk free rate.
16The term on the denominator, is obtained from the expression of the pre-tax value of the equity of the
firm, when solvent, obtained in (11). This is then subtracted from the overall value of the firm, in (13), to
obtain the value of debt.
17Condition 2 above is in fact stated for this case.
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and no fire sale, so each firm would rather use 100% debt financing. The only remaining
alternative is that firms use a mixture of debt and equity and face the possibility of fire sales.
We also see from the previous analysis that uncertainty only aﬀects the returns and
default decisions of individual firms. All other equilibrium variables, aggregate consumption,
investment, and market prices are deterministic.
4.1 Steady-state equilibria
A steady state is a competitive equilibrium {(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ )}∞=0 in which for all  ≥ 0
(∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗  ∗ ) = (∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗) 
We show first that a steady state exists and is unique. In addition, the system of condi-
tions defining a steady state can be reduced to a system of two equations.
Proposition 6 Under the maintained assumptions, there exists a unique steady-state equi-
librium, obtained as a solution of the following system of equations:
∗ = (1−  (
∗))R ∗
0
()  (18)
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗( − ∗)  1− ¯  (19)µ
1
∗ −
1
∗
¶
(+ ∗∗)  (
∗)
1−  (∗) =   (20)
We can then also identify some of the comparative statics properties of the steady state.
Proposition 7 (i) An increase in the tax rate  increases the steady value of ∗ (and hence
the debt-equity ratio) and reduces the one of ∗, but the eﬀect on ∗ (and hence ∗ and ∗)
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is ambiguous.
(ii) An increase in the discount factor  decreases the steady-state value of ∗ (and hence the
debt-equity ratio) and increases the one of ∗ as well of ∗, so that ∗ and ∗ increase too.
To get some intuition for these results, consider in particular the case of an increase in
the tax rate  . This increases the cost of equity financing, so that firms shift to higher debt
financing, thus decreasing the liquidity available in sub-period B and hence the liquidation
value of defaulting firms. While the direct eﬀect of the higher tax rate, by making equity
financing costlier, is clearly to decrease , the fact that the higher tax increases debt financing
() has an opposite eﬀect on , increasing it as we see from (19), hence the ambiguity of the
overall eﬀect on .
4.2 Transition dynamics
The steady state is often studied because of its simplicity, but non-steady-state paths may
have very diﬀerent properties. For this particular model, however, the steady state is repre-
sentative of equilibrium paths in general, at least if one is willing to assume that consumers
are risk neutral.18 In that case, we can show that, in any equilibrium, there is a constant
equilibrium capital structure which coincides with the steady state capital structure; the
same is then true for   and . Thus, outside the steady state, the only variable that is
18Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, risk aversion is not an issue. The only role played by the
curvature of the utility function is to determine the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS).
By assuming that the utility function is linear, one imposes a constant IMRS. This restricts somewhat the
adjustment of endogenous variables along the transition path, but is otherwise innocuous.
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changing is the capital stock, which converges monotonically to the steady-state value. In
this sense, little is lost by focusing on the steady state. The analysis of transition dynamics
is relegated for completeness to Appendix B.
5 Welfare analysis
5.1 The ineﬃciency of equilibrium
If we compare the conditions for a Pareto eﬃcient steady state derived in Proposition 2 with
the conditions for a steady-state equilibrium derived in Section 4.1, we find that steady-state
equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient if ∗ = , which happens when the equilibrium market value
of capital is given by
∗ = 
1− ¯
From the equilibrium conditions, in particular Condition 2, it can be seen immediately that
the equality above can hold only if  = 0. In that case, there is no cost of issuing equity and
the firms in the consumption goods sector will choose 100% equity finance. On the other
hand, when   0, as we have been assuming, the equilibrium market value of capital ∗ is
strictly lower than 
1−¯ and ∗ and ∗ are strictly less than the corresponding values at the
first best steady state. Thus, in a steady state equilibrium, the financial frictions given by
market incompleteness and the costs of default and equity financing as perceived by firms
imply that firms invest a lower amount and the equilibrium stock of capital is lower than at
the eﬃcient steady state. Hence even with a representative consumer, competitive equilibria
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are Pareto ineﬃcient19.
Short of getting rid of the corporate income tax, a policy of changing the tax rate so
as to reduce the tax revenue would also improve welfare. As we saw in the comparative
statics exercise20, such change in the tax rate will increase the value of the firm (capital
goods), causing an increase in investment and consumption. Similarly, policies such as
accelerated depreciation, expensing of investments in research and development, or subsidies
on investment, will also increase welfare.
In our simplified model, all firms are ex ante identical. If firms are heterogeneous, how-
ever, it might be advantageous to target firms that are vulnerable to fire sales, either because
they are riskier or because they have less liquid markets for liquidated capital goods. In that
case, a uniform tax rate on corporate income, combined with incentives for particular indus-
tries, might be called for.
5.2 Constrained ineﬃciency
It is not surprising that the equilibrium is Pareto-ineﬃcient in the presence of financial
frictions aﬀecting firms’ financing. To assess the scope of policy and regulatory interventions,
however, it is more interesting and appropriate to see whether a welfare improvement can
19When the initial capital stock 0 =  the unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation of the economy is the
Pareto eﬃcient steady state. Since as we saw the equilibrium allocation is diﬀerent, it is clearly Pareto
ineﬃcient. For other values of 0 the transitional dynamics of the Pareto eﬃcient allocation needs also to
be considered to claim the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium. This can be shown formally by proceeding along
similar lines to the ones of the next section.
20See in particular the Proof of Proposition 7 in the appendix.
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be found, taking as given the presence of such frictions (market incompleteness, finance
constraints and distortionary taxation). More precisely, we examine whether regulating the
levels of a single endogenous variable, in particular, the capital structure as represented
by , can lead to a welfare improvement while allowing all other variables to reach their
equilibrium levels. If so, we say that competitive equilibria are constrained ineﬃcient.
Suppose the economy is in a steady state equilibrium and consider an intervention con-
sisting in a permanent21 change ∆ starting at some fixed but arbitrary date  + 1. Thus
from this date onwards  is constant and equal to ∗+∆ To determine the welfare eﬀects
of this intervention we need to trace the changes in equilibrium prices, investment and con-
sumption over time and hence the transition to the new steady state. To make this analysis
more transparent, we assume as in Section 4.2 that consumers are risk neutral22, that is,
 () = .
The induced changes in the equilibrium variables  and  are then obtained by substi-
tuting the new value of  into the market-clearing condition in sub-period , (9),
 (1−  (∗ +∆)) = +1+
Z ∗+∆
0
 (21)
and the law of motion of , appearing in Condition 2 of the definition of a competitive
21We focus attention on a permanent intervention, but it is fairly easy to verify that the same welfare
result holds in the case of a temporary intervention.
22See footnote 18 for a discussion of this specification of consumers’ preferences.
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equilibrium,23
+ = 
½
+ +1+¯ − +1+
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
 (22)
for all  ≥ 024 We see from (21) that the new equilibrium value for + is the same for all 
and from (22) we obtain a first-order diﬀerence equation in . The solution of this equation
diverges monotonically since the coeﬃcient on +1+ has absolute value¯¯¯¯
¯ − 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¯¯¯¯
 max
½
¯ 
Z 1
∗+∆
( − ∗ −∆)
¾
≤ max©¯  ¯ª = ¯  1
Hence, the only admissible solution is obtained by setting + equal to its new steady-state
value:
+ = +1+ = ∗ +∆ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗+∆( − ∗ −∆)  (23)
The new equilibrium investment level is then determined by the optimality condition for
the capital goods producers, (10),
+0 (+) = 1 (24)
Since, by the previous argument, + is equal to its new steady-state equilibrium value,
∗+∆, we have + = ∗+∆ for all  ≥ 0, where the sign of ∆ equals the sign of ∆ By
substituting this value into the capital market clearing condition, (16) we obtain that the
23We used here (9) and the property 1 + + = 1 following from the specification of consumers’
preferences, to simplify the expression.
24Note that expressions (21) and (22) give us the new equilibrium levels of  and  also for any discrete
change ∆, as long as we have  ≥ , that is as long as  +∆ is not too close to 0
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law of motion of the capital stock is now
++1 = ¯+ +  (∗ +∆)
for all  ≥ 0, with  = ∗
The dynamics of agents’ consumption is given by the following equations:
+ = + − (∗ +∆) , for all  ≥ 0
By substituting the values of  obtained from the law of motion of capital, we find that the
change in consumption for a (marginal) change in  (and hence in  and ) is given by
∆ = −∆
∆+ =
(
−1 +1− ¯

1− ¯ 
0 (∗)
)
∆ ∀ ≥ 1
and hence the eﬀect on agents’ welfare is
∞X
=0
∆+ =
(
1
1− 
µ
−1 + 
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶
−
∞X
=1
¡¯¢ 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
)
∆
=
½
− 1
1−  +
µ
 1
1− ¯
0 (∗)
¶µ 
1−  −
¯
1− ¯
¶¾
∆
The term in brackets in this expression is strictly positive because, as we showed in the
previous section, in a steady-state equilibrium we always have
 
1− ¯ 
1
0(∗) = 
∗
Hence, consumers’ welfare increases if and only if ∆  0.
From (23) it is then easy to verify that sign ∆ = sign ∆, since

∗
Z 1
∗
( − ∗) = −
Z 1
∗
  0
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From (24) we obtain then

 =



 =


µ
− 
0
00
¶
 0
This establishes the following:
Proposition 8 The steady state competitive equilibrium is constrained ineﬃcient: a perma-
nent increase in  above its equilibrium value is welfare improving.
The intervention is specified in terms of the threshold  below which the firm has to
default on its debt. As argued in Section 4 a marginal increase of ∗ corresponds to an
increase in the firms’ debt-equity ratio.
Proposition 8 establishes the optimality of a marginal increase in  Consider then a
sequence of discrete changes ∆, such that  + ∆ approaches 1. Along such a sequence,
 goes to zero25 and we also see from (23) that  approaches 
1−¯ and hence, by (6), 
approaches . That is, in the limit, the equilibrium corresponding to such an intervention
converges to the steady-state, first-best allocation.26 We can then say that the constrained
optimal capital structure of firms exhibit maximal leverage.
To get some understanding of the determinants of the above result, note first that, when
firms increase their leverage, that is,  is increased above ∗, the tax paid on each unit of
capital,  R 1 ( − ) , decreases. At the same time, as we can see from the expression of
25Note that the equilibrium condition (21) has an admissible solution for all  +∆  1, but not in the
limit for  +∆ = 1
26In contrast, we see from (12), that when firms act as price takers their optimal decision when  → 0 is
 ∼ 0
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the firms’ market value in (13), firms face a higher probability and hence a higher expected
capital loss in default, given by the diﬀerence between the liquidated value of the firm’s
assets, , and the normal market value, . At a competitive equilibrium, firms do not want
to deviate from ∗ as the private costs and benefits of a marginal increase in leverage oﬀset
each other. The private cost of default depends, however, on prices and, when all firms
change their leverage choices, prices change. Once we substitute for  its equilibrium value
from the market-clearing condition (9), as we did in (23), we find that the higher losses
incurred by a firm when bankrupt are perfectly oﬀset by the higher gains made when solvent
(when the firm is able to buy capital at cheaper prices). As a consequence, the net eﬀect
of an increase in  by all firms, when we take the change in prices into account, is just
the decrease in the cost of the tax paid, and the firms’ value  increases. Thus, once the
pecuniary externality is internalized, the cost of debt financing turns out to be lower than
the cost perceived by firms. Hence, a higher leverage induces a higher level of . This in
turn increases the firms’ investment, which raises the capital stock in the economy. Since the
equilibrium accumulation of capital is ineﬃciently low, as we noticed in Section 5.1, due to
costs of equity and debt financing perceived by firms, the increase in investment and capital
generates a welfare improvement.
The cost of bankruptcy as perceived by firms is a pure transfer, as the fire sale losses of
bankrupt firms provide capital gains for the solvent firms. The same is true for the corporate
income tax, in that case a transfer from solvent firms to consumers. Since the tax revenue is
paid directly to households, one might think this has something to do with the fact that the
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tax reduces . In fact, it depends crucially on how the tax revenues are paid out. Suppose
the revenues from the tax were paid to firms instead of households. The distortion will
remain as long as the transfers are lump sum, i.e., not proportional to the firm’s capital
stock. A rational manager will perceive that an increase in the firm’s capital stock increases
its tax liability, but does not increase the transfer received, so he will still have an incentive
to underinvest in equilibrium. Only if the transfer were proportional to the value of equity,
i.e., the tax base, would the distortionary eﬀect disappear.
It is important to note that our result on the welfare benefits of increasing firms’ leverage
does not depend on the absence of deadweight costs of bankruptcy. Suppose we were to
assume that bankrupt firms lose a fraction 0    1 of their output, consumed by the
costs of the bankruptcy process. Each firm would take into account this additional cost of
bankruptcy when it chooses its optimal capital structure. The actual costs of bankruptcy for
the firm (the costs once the pecuniary externality is internalized) in this case are positive,
but it is still true that they are lower than the costs perceived by the firm, since the latter
overestimate the costs of fire sales, due to the pecuniary externality. As a consequence, it
remains true that increasing ∗ will increase the value of capital ∗ and as a result the level
of investment and the capital stock will increase too. Since the equilibrium again exhibits
underinvestment, such increase in the investment level always increases welfare, as in the
situation considered in this section.
But now an increase in ∗ has another eﬀect on welfare, going in the opposite direction,
as it will also increase the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and hence reduce the resources
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that a given stock of capital generates for consumption. Which of the two eﬀects dominates
depends on the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ and hence ∗. In Appendix B
we replicate the analysis for the economy with deadweight costs of bankruptcy and show
that, if the elasticity of investment with respect to ∗ is suﬃciently high, an increase in
∗ is welfare-improving since the increase in investment is suﬃciently large relative to the
increase in deadweight costs. Thus, the distortion caused by fire sales remains the crucial
determinant of the welfare eﬀects of an increase in firms’ leverage.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the firms’ capital structure choice in a dynamic general equilibrium econ-
omy with incomplete markets. Firms face a standard trade-oﬀ between the exemption of
interest payments on debt from the corporate income tax and the risk of bankruptcy and
fire sales. Fire sales are endogenously determined in equilibrium and arise from the illiquid-
ity of the capital market where the firm’s assets are sold. When the corporate income tax
rate is positive we show that fire sales are an essential part of the equilibrium, the optimal
capital structure is uniquely determined in equilibrium and firms’ investment is lower than
at its first-best level. Moreover, the debt/equity ratio chosen by firms is ineﬃciently low:
a regulatory intervention inducing firms to increase their leverage generates an increase of
firms’ return to capital and hence also of their investment level and of consumers’ welfare.
These findings highlight the importance of recognizing the presence of a pecuniary ex-
ternality when firms evaluate the private cost of default due to fire sales. The sale of the
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assets of bankrupt firms at fire-sale prices clearly entails a loss for such firms, but constitutes
at the same time a gain for solvent firms who are so able to purchase capital cheaply. Our
analysis shows that, by ignoring the eﬀect of a higher leverage ratio on the fire-sale price of
firms’ assets, firms underestimate the benefits of these purchases and perceive the cost of
debt as higher than what it actually is. It is through such pecuniary externalities, concerning
the price of liquidated assets, that interventions modifying the firms’ capital structure aﬀect
welfare in general equilibrium when markets are incomplete.
We also showed the robustness of our findings to the presence of additional, deadweight
costs of firms’ default given by the destruction of value of the firms’ assets. As long as
firms perceive the negative eﬀect of these deadweight costs on their market value, they will
still overestimate the costs of debt financing and hence an intervention increasing firms’
leverage still increases investment. We can also think however at environments where there
are deadweight costs of bankruptcy that firms do not take into account, for instance costs
imposed on other firms because of the disruption in the financial system27, in which case
a higher leverage may have detrimental eﬀects on firms’ investments. In any case, as we
noticed, in the presence of deadweight costs of bankruptcy higher leverage also means higher
social costs in terms of the destruction of resources produced by bankruptcy, so we have
forces pulling in opposite directions the constrained eﬃcient level of firms’ leverage relative
to the equilibrium one, but the eﬀect we identified remains present.
27Also, in Lorenzoni (2008) and some of the other papers mentioned in the Introduction the capital of
bankrupt firms can only be sold to diﬀerent types of firms who operate a less productive technology, hence
there is a deadweight cost attached to fire sales.
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Although the model we have studied deals with corporate debt, the results are suggestive
for the current debate about the funding and capital structure of financial institutions in the
wake of the financial crisis. A similar exercise for financial institutions would seem to be an
important topic for future research.
In the rest of this section, we briefly discuss the sensitivity of our results to some of the
features of the model.
Aggregate uncertainty A special feature of our model is the fact that the shocks af-
fecting firms are purely idiosyncratic and there is no aggregate risk. There has been a lot
of interest in the macroeconomic literature about the role of financial frictions in the prop-
agation of economic shocks. A large and influential stream of this literature concerns the
financial accelerator. In this literature, recalled in the Introduction, firms’ financing plays
an important role. Because of moral hazard problems, firms’ ability to borrow is limited by
the value of equity or of the assets that serve as collateral. A negative shock to the value
of equity and collateral reduces the firms’ ability to borrow for investment and this in turn
propagates through the cycle. In recent papers (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010), the focus has
been shifted to the role of banks and the way in which fluctuations in bank capital restrict
lending and propagate business cycle disturbances.
Our focus, unlike this macroeconomic literature, is on questions of eﬃciency and regu-
lation, rather than business cycle dynamics. Extending the analysis to include aggregate
uncertainty would make the model less tractable, but we believe it would not change the
fundamental qualitative features of the results we obtained. Suppose, for example, that we
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introduce an additional, aggregate shock aﬀecting the depreciation of firms’ capital: each
unit of capital used by firm  at date  is reduced, after production of the consumption good,
to  units, where  is a common shock and  and  are independent.28 The law of
motion of capital becomes
+1 = ¯ +  () 
hence the accumulation of capital is now stochastic.
In this simple environment, under the maintained risk neutrality assumption, both the
equilibrium value of liquidated capital  and the market value of capital  decrease with the
magnitude of the shock  while the firms’ capital structure, as described by , is not aﬀected
by . Also, the pecuniary externality is still present, leading firms to overestimate the cost of
bankruptcy and debt financing and choose too little debt in the equilibrium capital structure.
The introduction of risk aversion may generate additional aﬀects. For example, an increase in
the use of debt financing might increase the volatility of prices, which could have a negative
eﬀect on the welfare of risk averse individuals. On the other hand, since firms take into
account the eﬀect of risk on consumers’ valuation of their plans, at the margin it is not clear
that this eﬀect will dominate the pecuniary externality. An answer to this question would
require a proper quantitative analysis and is a matter for further research.
More generally, the extension of the model to allow for aggregate risk could oﬀer some
interesting implications for the properties of the equilibrium prices of debt and equity, as
well as for the pattern of consumption and investment over the business cycle. The eﬀects
28See Appendix B for a formal analysis of this case and the derivation of some properties of equilibria.
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of aggregate uncertainty on the firms’ choice of capital structure is also of interest. We plan
to pursue these issues in future work.
Liquidity provision In our stylized model, there is only one technology for producing
consumption goods. The only choice for the firms in the consumption goods sector is how
to finance their purchases of capital goods. In particular, they have no control over the
riskiness of the production technology. This may be seen as a limitation, since in practice
firms may be able to diversify their business lines to reduce the risk of default. To test the
robustness of our results, it is then useful to consider an extension of the analysis where an
alternative, safe technology can be used to produce consumption goods using capital goods.
The safe technology is subject to a non-stochastic depreciation rate 1 − ¯, but has a lower
productivity   .
We can interpret the safe technology as a way to provide liquidity in the economy. It
allows firms to make capital gains from the purchase of assets in fire sales whenever liquidity
is scarce in the system. It can be shown29 that in equilibrium firms will specialize in one of
the technologies. There proves to be in fact no advantage to combining the safe and risky
technology. More interestingly, we find that introducing the safe technology does little to
mitigate the ineﬃciency: on the contrary it generates an additional source of ineﬃciency
and, as long as  is not too high, it reduces welfare. Although the presence of firms using
the safe technology reduces the scale of the fire sales and raises the price of liquidated
assets, it reduces the returns to capital and hence the incentives to invest. The mechanism
29The details are in Appendix B.
47
generating the ineﬃciency is now partly diﬀerent: the introduction of a safe technology
diverts the capital gains from purchases at fire-sale prices to the firms choosing the safe but
less productive technology, thus depriving the firms choosing the risky technology of some
of those gains.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 From the strict concavity of  and the gradient inequality, it
follows that, for any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ ˆ + 0 ³ˆ´³ − ˆ´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ
Hence
 () + ¯  ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¯  ˆ
For any   ˆ,
 () ≤ 
³
ˆ
´
+ 0
³
ˆ
´

³
 − ˆ
´
 ¡1− ¯¢ ˆ + ¡1− ¯¢ ³ − ˆ´
=
¡
1− ¯¢ 
where the second inequality follows from the assumptions made on  (·), implying the exis-
tence of a unique solution for ˆ. Thus,
  ˆ =⇒ +1  
and
  ˆ =⇒ +1  ˆ
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Proof of Proposition 2 At an optimal steady state the multipliers {(∗  ∗ )}∞=0 satisfy
∗ = 0 (∗) = ∗0
and hence
∗ = 
∗

0 (∗) =
∗0
∗0∗0 = 
∗0
for every . The first-order conditions for the steady-state optimum can then be written as
0 (∗) = ∗0 (25)
∗0+ ∗0¯ = ∗0 (26)
∗00 (∗) = ∗0 (27)
Conditions (26) and (27) can be rewritten as

1− ¯ =
∗0
∗0 =
1
0 (∗) (28)
The feasibility conditions become
∗ + ∗ = ∗
and
∗ = ¯∗ +  (∗) 
Thus,
∗ =  (
∗)
1− ¯ 
where ∗ is determined by (28).
55
Proof of Proposition 4 The derivative of the expression in (13) with respect to +1 is
easily calculated to be
1
1 + 
½
(+ +1+1)  (+1)− +1
µ 
+1 + +1
¶
 (+1) +
+1 (+1 − +1)  (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))}
=
1
1 + 
½µ
1− +1+1
¶
 (+1) +
µ
1− +1+1
¶
+1+1 (+1) + +1 (1−  (+1))
¾

The first-order condition for an interior solution of the firm’s problem requires this expression
to equal zero, a condition which can be written as
µ+1
+1 − 1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1) = +1 (1−  (+1)) 
or µ
1
+1 −
1
+1
¶
(+ +1+1)  (+1)
1−  (+1) =  
A solution to this equation, if it exists, is unique since all terms on the left hand side are
positive and increasing in +1. The term  + +1+1 is in fact clearly increasing in +1,
and so is (+1)
1− (+1) under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate.
From the above expression we then see that when
³
1
+1 − 1+1
´
 (0) ≥  we have a
corner solution with +1 = 0. In contrast, when
³
1
+1 − 1+1
´
 (0)   (and +1  +1)
it is easy to verify that a corner solution with +1 = 1 never exists. By the continuity of
the objective function in +1, a solution always exists, so it follows that an interior solution
exists.
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Market clearing in the securities market The value of debt and equity issued by each
firm at any  is equal to the market value of depreciated capital, ¯, plus the value of
newly produced capital goods,  ()  To find the consumer’s savings, we need first to find
the value of the consumer’s wealth in sub-period  of date . This is equal to the sum of
the profits from the capital good sector, the proceeds from the liquidation of firms which
defaulted in this period, and the value of the firms that did not default in the period minus
the corporation tax plus the lump sum transfer from the government. The corporation tax
and the transfer cancel in equilibrium, hence the consumer’s wealth, , is given by
 =  ()−  +
Z 
0
(+ )  +
Z 1


µ
 + 
¶

Using the market clearing condition in the liquidation market (9), this simplifies to:
 =  ()−  + + ¯
Therefore, the securities market clears at date  if
 −  =  ()−  + + ¯ − 
=  ¡¯ +  ()¢
or
 +  = 
So market clearing in the consumption goods market (15) implies market clearing in the
securities markets, as claimed.
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Proof of Proposition 6 Equations (18) and (20) come directly from Conditions 4 and 2
of the definition of competitive equilibrium, applied to a steady state. From the equation
specifying the law of motion of the value of the firm, using the fact that at a steady state
1(1 + ∗) = , we then get
∗ = 
½Z ∗
0
(+ ∗) +
Z 1
∗
µ∗
∗ (+ 
∗)− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½Z ∗
0
µ
+ ∗ −
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
∗
¶
 +
Z 1
∗
µ
+ ∗ +
µ∗
∗ − 1
¶
− ∗( − ∗)
¶

¾
= 
½
+ ∗¯ −
Z 1

∗( − ∗)
¾
where in the last step we used (18) to simplify the expression. Solving for  we get:
∗ = 
1− ¯ +  R 1∗ ( − ∗) 
that is, equation (19).
Let  (∗) denote the solution of equation (19) with respect to  and  (∗) that of (18),
also with respect to  Note that  (∗) is a strictly increasing and  (∗) a strictly decreasing
function of ∗. The remaining condition (20) can then be written as
µ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗)
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =   (29)
and it is clear from inspection that all the terms on the left hand side are increasing in ∗,
so there exists at most one solution, that is one steady state.
To see that there exists a solution to (29), note that as ∗ → 0,  (∗) → ∞ and
 (∗) → 
1−¯+¯ , so for some finite value ∗  0 we have  (∗) =  (∗) and the left hand
side of (29) equals zero. Next, consider what happens as ∗ → 1 and note that  (∗) → 0
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and  (∗) → 
1−¯  0, so the left hand side of (29) is positive and arbitrarily large. Thus,
by continuity, there exists a value of 0  ∗  1 satisfying (29).
Proof of Proposition 7 Consider first the eﬀects of a change in  or . From equation
(18) it is clear that the solution  (∗) is independent of  and  whereas the solution of
equation (19)  (∗   ) is decreasing in  and increasing in . Substituting into (29)
µ
1−  (
∗)
 (∗   )
¶µ 
 (∗) + 
∗
¶  (∗)
1−  (∗) =   (30)
we see that an increase in  increases the right hand side and, by decreasing  (∗   ), it
decreases the left hand side. Thus, for the above condition to be satisfied, the left hand
side must be increased and that requires an increase in ∗. Thus, an increase in  increases
∗ and, hence, reduces ∗ =  (∗). Since  (∗   ) is increasing in ∗ and decreasing in
 , the net eﬀect on ∗ (and hence the eﬀect on ∗ and ∗) is uncertain. What we can
say, from equation (19), is that ∗ (and hence ∗ and ∗) will increase if the tax revenue
 R 1∗ ( − ∗)  declines as a result of the increase in  .
Now consider the impact of an increase in . An increase in  will increase  (∗   )
and hence increase the term on the left hand side of (30). For the condition to hold, ∗ must
then decrease to ensure this term stays constant, needed for (30) to hold. This implies that
∗ increases. The overall eﬀect on  of the decrease in ∗ and increase of  since the term on
the left hand side of (30) must stay constant for (20) to hold, is that  increases (actually
more than ). Hence ∗ and ∗ also increase.
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